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make the vessel seaworthy by the start of
the voyage. ld. (citing Atlantic Richfield,
640 F.2d at 761-62).

cause of the radar failure. ld. at 472. The
court noted that Deutsche Shell would
have discovered all of the radar system's
problems had it performed a routine
overhaul. Id. at 473.

Because the Fifth Circuit found that
Deutsche Shell did not exercise due
diligence in maintaining its radar, it
declined to decide whether a general
average act occurred and whether the issue
was properly raised in the proceeding.
Deutsche Shell, 993 F.2d at 469. The court
upheld the district court's conclusion that
Deutsche Shell failed to exercise due
diligence to maintain the vessel's radar in
seaworthy conditions. Id. at 470. The court
held that the radar failed because of water
incursion resulting from Deutsche Shell's
lack of maintenance. ld. at 472. The court
cited the district court's fmdings that no
repair log was kept and the antenna array
was never removed and overhauled despite
the manufacturer's recommendation that
an overhaul be performed every two years.
Id. at 471. The antenna cover which is
exposed to harsh weather conditions
becomes porous after time, allowing water
seepage. ld.
After the accident, a
technician boarded the vessel to repair the
radar system. Deutsche Shell, 993 F.2d at
471. His report indicated signs of water
damage. Id.
After extensive study, all
evidence pointed to water incursion as a

The circuit court, contrary to the
district court, did fmd evidence that the
T/R Cell had been replaced within its
useful life expectancy. Id. Nonetheless,
the court held that the water incursion,
resulting from Deutsche Shell's lack of
maintenance, caused the radar to fail and
was sufficient to support Placid's judgment.
Deutsche Shell, 993 F.2d at 473.
Deutsche Shell contended that even
if there was a lack of due diligence in
maintaining the radar, such inaction did
not proximately cause the grounding of the
vessel as the district court concluded. ld. at
473-74. The court rejected this argument,
fmding that the river flood state and the
pilot's decision to anchor because of the
two failed radar units were sufficiently
foreseeable events. Id. at 474. The court
noted that grounding is the risk a vessel
faces when operating without an adequate
radar system. ld.
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Seventh Circuit holds that admiralty jurisdiction extends to tortious acts only if the
alleged act ( 1) occurred "on the navigable waters of the United States," (2) created
"a potential hazard to maritime commerce," and (3) was "substantially related to
traditional maritime activity." Federal admiralty jurisdiction extends to a claim
alleging that the negligent installation of pile clusters on a navigable waterway of
the United States caused substantial damage on land far from the waterway and
resulted in the closing of the waterway. Seventh Circuit holds that a corporate
shipowner's liability is limited to the owner's interest in the vessel under the
Limitation Act for damages resulting from the acts of purely ministerial employees,
but is not limited when a managerial employee personally participates in the
negligent act.
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), or in the alternative, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be
granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Id.
The
district court granted the motions and
Great Lakes appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

FACTS: On April 13, 1992, a breach
occurred in the roof of a freight delivery
tunnel below the Chicago River. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of
Chicago, 3 F.3d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1993).
Water flooded the tunnel and tunnel
system located throughout downtown
Chicago, resulting in damage to some of
the buildings connected to the tunnel
Business was disrupted in
system. Id.
downtown Chicago for several days and
because the Captain of the Port of Chicago
ordered the river closed near the tunnel
rupture, maritime traffic was disrupted for
more than a month. ld. Thereafter, the
City of Chicago ("City"), individuals, and
businesses filed suit in the Cook County
Circuit Court against Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Company ("Great Lakes"), alleging
that Great Lakes' negligent installation of
pile clusters near the Kinzie Street Bridge
in the Chicago River caused the tunnel
breach and resulting flood. Id.

!d.

ISSUES: (a) Did the district court err in
concluding
that
federal admiralty
jurisdiction does not extend to a claim
alleging that the negligent installation of
pile clusters on a navigable waterway of the
United States caused substantial damage
on land far from the waterway and resulted
in the closing of the waterway?
(b) Did the district court err in
dismissing a corporate shipowner's claim
under the Limitation of Vessel Owner's
Liability Act for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted before
determining which corporate employees, if
any, were negligent?

C l a i m i ng· federal
admiralty
jurisdiction, Great Lakes filed a three
count complaint in the District Court for
the Northern District of illinois on October
6, 1992. Id.
Great Lakes sought
exoneration from or limitation of liability
pursuant to the Limitation of Vessel
Owner's Liability Act (Limitation Act), 46
App. U.S.C.A §§ 181-96 (West 1993), and
requested contribution or indemnity from
the City for any damages which Great
Lakes might be adjudged liable. Great
Lakes, 3 F.3d at 226.
Great Lakes
maintained that the City was responsible
for the flooding "either because it failed to
disclose to Great Lakes the existence of
the tunnel near the Kinzie Street Bridge
or because it failed to adequately repair
and maintain the tunnel." Id.

ANALYSIS:
(a) The Seventh Circuit
began by noting that admiralty jurisdiction
over torts was originally determined by the
"locality" (or "situs") test. Id. at 227. The
court stated that "[u]nder this test, 'every
species of tort, however occurring, and
whether on board a vessel or not, if upon
the high seas or navigable waters, is of
admiralty cognizance.'" Great Lakes, 3 F.3d
at 227 (quoting The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 20, 36 (1865)). The court further
observed, however, that the Supreme
Court never held this test to be the
determinative factor establishing admiralty
jurisdiction. Id.
The Seventh Circuit
described a three prong test to determine
the existence of admiralty jurisdiction
which the Supreme Court has established
during the previous twenty years in

Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. ("Grubart"),
a downtown business which allegedly
suffered flood damage, and the City filed a
motion to dismiss Great Lakes' complaint

Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), Foremost
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Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668
(1982), and Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358
(1990), rev'g Complaint of Sisson, 867 F.2d
341 (7th Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J.). Great
Lakes, 3 F.3d at 227-28. The Seventh
Circuit stated that in order for admiralty
jurisdiction to exist over an alleged
negligent act, the act must have (1)
occurred "on the navigable waters of the
United States," (2) created· "a potential
hazard to maritime commerce," and (3)
been "substantially related to traditional
maritime activity." Id. at 228. The Seventh
Circuit first observed that the district
court, although knowledgeable of this three
prong test, utilized a "totality of the
circumstances" test, set forth in Kelly v.
Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973).
Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 228. The Seventh
Circuit stated that following Sisson, this
established three prong test must be
utilized, rather than the sort of policy
analysis engaged in by the district court.
Id. The court then applied the facts of this
case to the three prong test and concluded
that federal admiralty jurisdiction existed
over this case. Id. at 230.

shore. Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 229 (citing
GreenleafJohnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison,
237 u.s. 251, 263 (1915)).
The court next cited the Admiralty
Extension Act, 46 App. U.S.CA § 740
(West 1993), which provides that admiralty
jurisdiction extends to all damage resulting
from a vessel on navigable waters even if
the damage occurs on land. Great Lakes, 3
F.3d at 229. Although the respondents
contended that Great Lakes' barges were
not ''vessels" because they were utilized as
stationary platforms at the time of the
incident, the court stated "that a craft is a
'vessel' if its purpose is to some reasonable
degree 'the transportation of passengers,
cargo, or equipment from place to place
across navigable waters.'" Id. . (quoting
Johnson v. John F. Beasley Construction
Co. , 742 F.2d 1054, 1063 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985)).
Because Great Lakes engaged in such
transportation, the court held Great Lakes'
barges to be within that defmition. Id.
The court further rejected the
appellees' argument that admiralty
jurisdiction was precluded because the area
of damage and the passage of six months
were "too 'remote from the negligent act.'"
Id. (quoting Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S.
Corp. , 373 U.S. 206, 210 (1963)). The court
held
that
the temporal proximity
requirement was simply a "specialized rule"
of proximate cause and the six months
between Great Lakes' work and the
damage was sufficiently proximate to
invoke the Admiralty Extension Act, 46
App. U.S.C.A § 740 (West 1993). Great
Lakes, 3 F.3d at 229.

(1) In addressing the "'locality'"
requirement, the court stated that "a tort
occurs on navigable waters when its
"'substance and consummation" take place
there,' even though the allegedly negligent
act itself occurred on land." Id. at 229
(quoting 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 172 at
11-32 (7th ed. 1991), in turn quoting The
Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865)). The
court held that the alleged tort occurred on
navigable waters because Great Lakes'
vessels operated in the navigable "channel"
of the Chicago River, a navigable waterway
of the United States, while installing the
pile clusters. Id. (citing -Escanaba Co. v.
City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 67B, 683 (1883)).
Although Great Lakes installed the pile
clusters outside the navigable channel, the
court held this to be irrelevant because the
navigable waterway extends from shore to

(2)- Because commerce on the
Chicago River was disrupted for more than
a month while the river was closed, the
court held that the alleged tort created a
"potential hazard to maritime commerce."
Id. at 230. The court further rejected the
7
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appellees' argument that Sisson precluded
an analysis of what actually occurred
because here, unlike Sisson, maritime
commerce was actually disrupted and thus
such a counter-factual analysis was not
necessary. Id. at 230 n.7 (citing Sisson,
497 U.S. at 358 and Foremost, 457 U.S. at

groups: corporate managers, who have
discretionary authority, and ministerial
employees. Id. (citing 3 Benedict on
Admiralty§ 42 at 5-14 (7th rev. ed. 1991)).
The court ruled that a corporate shipowner
is shielded from liability for damages
resulting from the acts of purely
ministerial employees, but is not shielded
from liability when a managerial employee
personally participates in the negligent act.
Id. (citing 3 Benedict on Admiralty§ 42 at
5-14 (7th rev. ed. 1991)). Because the
record did not indicate whether the alleged
negligent act was performed by a
managerial or ministerial employee, the
court held that the district court erred in
dismissing Great Lakes' claim without
making such a factual determination. Id.
The court rejected the district court's
reliance on Joyce v. Joyce, 975 F.2d 379
(7th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that the
Limitation Act, 46 App. U.S.CA § 183(a)
(West 1993), will not limit Great Lakes'
liability. Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 231-32.
The court ruled that Joyce was not
applicable to the present case because
Joyce involved the negligent entrustment
of an individual rather than a corporate
shipowner. Id. at 232. Finally, the court
ruled that the "personal contracts doctrine"
would not prevent Great Lakes from
utilizing the Limitation Act, 46 App.
U.S.CA § 183(a) (West 1993), as the
district court ruled, because the "personal
contracts
doctrine"
only applied to
contracts and this action sounded in tort.
Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 232.

668).
(3) Finally, the Seventh Circuit
noted that when determining if an activity
is "substantially related to traditional
maritime activity," a court need only be
"concerned with 'the general character of
the activity."' Id. at 230 (quoting Sisson,
497 U.S. at 365). Although one of the
purposes of pile clusters is to protect
bridges, the court held that the installation
of pile clusters is related to maritime
activity because pile clusters also protect
ships when they collide with bridges and
aid ships in navigation. Id.

(b) The Limitation Act, 46 App.
U.S.C.A § 183(a) (West 1993), is intended
to shield owners from liability beyond their
interest in the vessel for loss or damage
incurred without the privity or knowledge
of the ship owner. Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at
230. Although the Limitation Act does not
defme "privity or knowledge," the court
stated that "privity or knowledge" is
understood to be an owner's 'personal
participation ... in the fault or negligence
which caused or contributed to the loss or
injury. "' Id. at 231 (quoting Coryell v.
Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 411 (1943). The
court further noted that a corporate
shipowner's employees consist of two
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Japan is not an alternative forum for a judgment declaring that vessel interests
have no right to recover general average contributions because Japan would
automatically enforce a forum selection clause in the bill of lading and dismiss the
action, thus providing a "clearly unsatisfactory" remedy.
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